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Sabotage in Tournaments: 
Evidence from a Laboratory Experiment
*
 
Although relative performance schemes are pervasive in organizations reliable empirical data 
on induced sabotage behavior is almost non-existent. We study sabotage in tournaments in a 
controlled laboratory experiment and are able to confirm one of the key insights from theory: 
effort and sabotage increase with the wage spread. Additionally, we find that even in the 
presence of tournament incentives, agents react reciprocally to higher wages, which 
mitigates the sabotage problem. Destructive activities are reduced by explicitly calling them 
by their name ‘sabotage’. Communication among principal and agents curbs sabotage due to 
agreements on flat prize structures and increased output. 
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In modern organizations, rewards based on relative performance are widely accepted as an 
essential component in the toolbox of incentive designers (Edward P. Lazear, 1999). 
According to estimates, a quarter of the Fortune 500 companies link parts of the individual 
merit of employees to a relative performance evaluation, for example by ‘forced rankings’ 
(Jeffrey Pfeffer and Robert I. Sutton, 1999). Internal promotion tournaments can also be 
regarded as relative performance schemes. The advantages credited to these schemes are 
manifold, ranging from diminishing the influence of global shocks, the sufficiency of ordinal 
ranking of output rather than absolute measurement, and the mitigation of hidden action 
problems. But incentive designers are also aware of a severe potential drawback: sabotage 
(Lazear 1989, Gary Charness and David I. Levine 2004). Sabotage can emerge when agents 
are able to deteriorate their competitors’ performance and thereby increase their own chances 
of a higher position in the ranking, for example, by refusing to cooperate, by concealing 
viable information, by transferring false or misleading information or even by destroying 
work tools needed by others.
1 Since sabotage can seriously harm the performance of 
organizations, it is of eminent importance to understand how different design characteristics 
of relative compensation schemes affect the behavior of agents. Unfortunately, sabotage 
activities can hardly be observed. For natural reasons agents engaging in sabotage are very 
careful in hiding their activities. This turns the task of collecting reliable field data on 
sabotage into an almost unsolvable challenge. 
To overcome this problem we study sabotage behavior in a controlled laboratory experiment. 
An experiment has the decisive advantage that one can precisely observe the effort and 
sabotage levels exerted by agents. Additionally, we are able to monitor how different design 
                                                 
1  Outside of organizations sabotage also appears to be omnipresent whenever relative performance evaluation is 
encountered. For a prominent example from sports recall the Tonya-Harding-Nancy-Kerrigan  case  where 
Harding’s rival Kerrigan was injured in an attack hatched by Harding’s ex-husband to keep Kerrigan off the 
Olympic ice skating team in 1994. Or remember the fictitious, but very illustrative chariot race with Charlton 
Heston in Ben Hur when he is sabotaged by his competitor Messala who mounted blades on the hubs, designed 
to chew up opposing chariots. Other examples can be found in presidential election campaigns where 
tremendous effort is exerted to damage the other candidates’ reputation by negative campaigning.   3
characteristics of relative performance schemes ceteris paribus affect behavior (for a 
discussion of the power of experiments in personnel and labor economics see Armin Falk and 
Ernst Fehr, 2003). In our experiment a principal can offer a tournament contract to a group of 
three agents. The contract specifies the total wage sum and the wage spread. The wage spread 
is the difference between the winner prize and the two loser prizes. The agent who obtains the 
highest output will be rewarded with the winner prize and the other two agents will receive 
the loser prize. After having seen the contract, the agents simultaneously choose (productive) 
effort and (destructive) sabotage. Effort increases the own output and sabotage reduces the 
output of the two other agents. Exerting effort and sabotage is costly for agents. The principal 
is rewarded proportionally to the total output reduced by a fraction of the wage costs. To the 
best of our knowledge, we are the first who provide clean evidence for one of the key insights 
from tournament theory, i.e., individual effort and sabotage levels ceteris paribus increase 
with the wage spread (Lazear, 1989). We can confirm that the incentive effects of the wage 
spread do not differ for different wage sums. Additionally, we are able to document that also 
in the presence of tournament incentives agents react reciprocally to a higher wage sum by 
increasing effort.
2 Interestingly, they keep their sabotage activity constant. Increasing effort 
indeed serves two goals: to reciprocate to the kind act of the principal and to increase the 
chances of winning the tournament. Reducing sabotage would only serve the first goal but 
would be detrimental for the second one. To attach some flavor of a (morally and legally) 
reprehensible deed to the destructive activity (compare Klaus Abbink and Heike Hennig-
Schmidt, 2006), we frame the setting, in an additional treatment, as an employment situation 
by explicitly speaking of ‘employer’ and ‘employees’ and by calling the two activities ‘effort’ 
and ‘sabotage’. This framing significantly reduces sabotage. The same is true for a third 
                                                 
2  Reciprocal reactions of workers under experimental fixed wage contracts are well documented (see, for 
example, Fehr, Georg Kirchsteiger, and Arno Riedl, 1993, Fehr, Simon Gächter, and Kirchsteiger, 1997, Fehr, 
Erich Kirchler, Andreas Weichbold, and Gächter, 1998, Fehr and Falk, 1999, Fehr and Gächter, 2000, Charness 
2004, Jordi Brandts and Charness, 2004, Bernd Irlenbusch and Dirk Sliwka, 2005, Charness and Peter Kuhn, 
2007).   4
treatment in which we allow the four players to communicate with each other by broadcasting 
text messages. Communication curbs sabotage since players agree on flat prize structures and 
increased output which is in line with previous findings that ‘cheap-talk’ often helps to 
improve efficiency (for a survey, see Vincent P. Crawford, 1998). 
Reliable empirical data on sabotage behavior in tournaments is almost non-existent. In an 
early questionnaire study, Robert W. Drago and Gerald T. Garvey (1998) present evidence on 
the influence of incentives on helping effort in work groups. Workers were asked about the 
inclination of others in their group to help. The results suggest that helping effort is reduced 
when incentives in promotion tournaments are strong. Since helping effort can be seen as 
opposite behavior to sabotage the tendency to behave destructively towards colleagues seems 
to increase with higher prize spreads. One has to bear in mind that these results are based on 
non-incentivized answers to sensitive questions that might be biased by other factors, like 
corporate culture or variations in sympathy towards colleagues. We are only aware of one 
empirical field study that deals with effort and sabotage in a competition. Luis Garicano and 
Ignacio Palacios-Huerta (2006) investigate an exogenous change in the reward structure of the 
FIFA (Fédération Internationale de Football Association) regulations on ‘sabotage’ in soccer 
games. The number of forwards and the number of shots on goals are taken as proxies for the 
amount of productive effort and the number of defenders and yellow cards measure sabotage. 
Exploiting data from a concurrently conducted competition involving the same teams in 
which the prize structure did not change they employ a difference-in-difference approach and 
report a tendency that proxies for both activities increase with the introduction of a higher 
prize spread. This is a quite interesting and very important result especially if one is interested 
in competitions between teams. It is, however, not straightforward how their findings relate to 
tournament theory. As is almost always the case with field data, one has to rely on proxies to 
measure essential elements of the model as effort, sabotage, and output. Additionally it is 
almost impossible to observe cost functions for effort and sabotage and what the payoff   5
functions of the principals and agents actually are. In a recent paper Jeffrey Carpenter, Peter 
Hans Matthews, and John Schirm (forthcoming) very nicely illustrate how ‘office politics’ are 
able to reverse the incentive effects of tournaments. In their real-effort experiment agents can 
influence the performance measurement of their competitors. Quite interestingly, the 
anticipation of the harmful influence of competitors discourages agents to exert effort in the 
first place. Thus, sabotage from tournament incentives might be detrimental not only because 
of destroying output but, additionally, because of preventing agents from exerting productive 
effort. Few other experiments investigate sabotage behavior.
3 Harbring, Irlenbusch, Matthias 
Kräkel, and Reinhard Selten (2007) study a Tullock-contest with heterogeneous agents in 
which sabotage can be individually addressed. They find that sabotage systematically varies 
with the composition of different types of contestants, for example, whether there are more 
underdogs than favorites or vice versa. Falk, Fehr, and David Huffman (2008) compare 
tournaments with and without sabotage possibilities. In their study the two agents have a 
binary choice whether they want to sabotage or not, i.e., sabotage cannot be gradually 
increased by an agent. Deciding to sabotage means to destroy all the output of the competitor. 
The data convincingly demonstrates that the possibility to engage in sabotage induces the 
principal to choose smaller prize spreads since the frequency of sabotage choices is lower for 
low spreads. Harbring and Irlenbusch (2005, 2008) vary the number of agents, the fraction of 
winner prizes or the magnitude of the winner prizes (without keeping the wage sum constant). 
It is shown that while tournament size has virtually no effect on behavior, a balanced fraction 
of winner and loser prizes appears to enhance productive activities. Higher winner prizes 
increase effort and sabotage, but it is not clear whether this is caused by the higher wage sum 
or the higher wage spread. 
                                                 
3  A number of experimental studies deal with the analysis of productive effort choice in various tournament 
settings, for example, Clive Bull, Andrew Schotter, and Keith Weigelt (1987), Schotter and Weigelt (1992), 
Frans van Dijk, Joep Sonnemans, and Frans van Winden (2001), Christine Harbring and Irlenbusch (2003), 
Alannah Orrison, Schotter, and Weigelt (2004). They all do not tackle the sabotage problem. For an overview 
and comparisons see Harbring and Irlenbusch (2005).   6
In this paper, we introduce a sabotage experiment by allowing the principal to design a 
tournament contract along two orthogonal dimensions, the prize spread and the total sum of 
prizes. Sabotage might be reduced by communication between the principal and the agents or 
by making the agents aware that the destructive activity actually is ‘sabotage’. These ways of 
potentially curbing sabotage are analyzed in two additional treatments. The rest of the paper 
proceeds as follows. In section I, we introduce a simple tournament model that serves as the 
baseline for our experiment. Section II describes the experimental setting and different 
treatments. Section III presents our findings and section IV concludes. 
 
I.  A Simple Model of Tournaments with Sabotage 
We employ a simple two-stage game with 4 players, 3 agents and one principal. As shown in 
Figure 1 the principal selects a wage contract in the first stage and in the second stage agents 
can exert two activities: productive effort and sabotage.  
 
Figure 1 about here 
 
The principal can offer a wage contract by specifying one of two possible wage sums 
W ∈ {300, 600} as well as the compression of wages. In the simplest case she selects full 
wage compression, i.e., a fixed wage of W/3 for each agent. If unequal wages are specified we 
assume that the three agents compete in a tournament for a winner prize M. The two losing 
agents receive a loser prize m with 0 < m < M. We denote the wage spread (M – m) by ∆ with 
(3m + ∆) = W, i.e., the sum of winner and loser prizes equals the wage sum.  
A strategy of an agent i is constituted by a pair (ei, si) where ei ∈ [0, …, 100] denotes effort 
and si ∈ [0, …, 50] is the sabotage activity which reduces the output of the two other agents. 
Exerting effort and sabotage is costly for each agent i. The costs are assumed to be symmetric   7
and are described by the functions Ce(ei)=ei
2/70 and Cs(si)=si
2/20, respectively.
4 The output yi 
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with εi as a random variable which is uniformly distributed over the interval [-60, +60] and 
assumed to be i.i.d. for each agent i. The random component, εi, resembles production luck or 
measurement error of output. The expected payoff for agent i is given by  
EΠi(ei, e-i, si, s-i) =  ) , , , ( i i i i
w s s e e f − − M + [1 –  ) , , , ( i i i i
w s s e e f − − ] m – Ce(ei) – Cs(si) 
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w s s e e f − −  denoting the probability for agent i to receive the winner prize if the 
other two agents choose effort levels  i e−  and sabotage activities  i s− .  
To provide a benchmark for behavior in the experiment let us have a look at the equilibrium 
prediction. For simplicity we assume that all players are rational, risk-neutral, and purely 
money-maximizing.
5 The expected payoff of an agent i can be written as 
EΠi(ei, e-i, si, s-i) = m +  ∆ − − ) , , , ( i i i i
w s s e e f  – ei
2/70 – si
2/20. 
If the principal chooses full wage compression ∆ = 0 (fixed wages) agents should exert no 
activity at all. For positive prize spreads the first-order conditions are given by 
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Provided our assumptions one can show that in a symmetric equilibrium the marginal 
probabilities of winning depend on the size of the interval from which the random component 
in the production function is drawn, i.e., one can show that (see, for example, Orrison, 
Schotter, and Weigelt 2004, Harbring and Irlenbusch 2008) 
                                                 
4 We assume that sabotage is costlier than productive effort resembling the fact that in the workplace an agent 
must exert some extra effort to conceal the destructive activity. Note that we implement identical cost functions 
for all agents. Lazear (1989) provides an analysis for heterogeneous personalities like ‘doves’ and ‘hawks’ by 
assuming differences in marginal costs of sabotage. A similar approach is taken in Harbring et al. (2007). 
5  For an illuminating analysis for inequity-averse agents see Christian Grund and Sliwka (2005).   8
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with  ε  denoting the size of the interval from which each εi is drawn. Thus, our first order 
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Note that an additional unit of effort has the same effect on improving the own position in the 
ranking as has one additional unit of sabotage. Thus, in equilibrium the marginal costs of the 
two activities have to be equal. To ensure that an interior solution exists and that agents have 
no incentive to deviate to activities of zero, the expected gain of an agent must not be lower 
than his cost, i.e.,  *) ( *) ( 3 / s C e C s e + ≥ ∆ . Additionally, the equilibrium effort level must lie 
in the feasible interval, i.e.,  100 *< e . An analogous statement must hold for sabotage, i.e., 
50 *< s . 
We assume that the principal’s expected payoff increases in the total output of the agents 
EΠP(e, s) =  W y E
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τ > 0  indicates how much the principal values one unit of output. We assume that the 
principal suffers a cost proportionally to the promised wage sum and denote the fraction of the 
wage costs the principal has to bear by θ  (0 < θ  ≤ 1). One interpretation would be that the 
principal is a manager who implements the wage system and is rewarded in proportion to the 
output and the wage costs of his team.  
Thus, in the symmetric tournament equilibrium the principal receives the following expected 
payoff depending on her choice of the prize spread ∆ and the total wage sum W:  





.   9
This reflects the standard tournament result that the principal’s payoff increases with the prize 
spread. Note that ceteris paribus the principal’s payoff is unaffected by the wage sum. If the 
principal anticipates the derived behavior of the agents and aims at maximizing her payoff, 
she chooses the highest possible wage spread and the lowest possible wage sum.  
 
II.  Experimental Design and Procedure 
Table 1 summarizes the design alternatives for the wage contracts. The principal can choose a 
wage sum W ∈ {300, 600} as well as one of the five prize spreads ∆j with j = 0, …, 4. A prize 
spread of zero is denoted by ∆0, i.e., all players receive the same fixed wage irrespective of 
the output they have achieved. Additionally, we allow the principal not to offer any contract at 
all, which results in a payoff of zero for the principal as well as all agents. 
 
Table 1 about here 
 
In the experiment, the value τ of one unit of output for the principal is set to τ = 3 and the cost 
parameter is set to  θ   =  0.3. Table 2 provides the corresponding effort and sabotage 
equilibrium predictions as well as the resulting expected output.  
 
Table 2 about here 
 
We consider five treatments.
6 We have one Baseline and two main treatments, Chat and 
Framing. The three treatments exactly follow the model described so far. Two additional 
treatments serve as a robustness check and are only briefly mentioned. In NoSabo agents can 
only choose productive effort, but no sabotage. In W300 the principal cannot choose a high 
wage sum, i.e., the wage sum is fixed and equal to 300. 
                                                 
6  Translations of the instruction sheets can be found in the supplementary material. Original instructions in 
German are available from the authors upon request.   10
Baseline 
In this treatment we avoid any value-laden terms. We do not speak of ‘sabotage’ or ‘principal’ 
or ‘agents’. Instead we speak of players as being of type I and type II. The player of type I has 
to choose between a high or a low transfer and has to specify a spread. Players of type II 
choose two numbers A and B.  
Chat 
All four players are allowed to broadcast text messages during the whole game. Players 
cannot be individually addressed but each message can be read by all other players (including 
the principal). All messages appear in a communication window on the screen similar to a 
chat forum. Participants are not allowed to use abusive language, to reveal their real identity 
or to refer to any activity after the experiment.  
Framing 
The setting is framed as an employment situation. Roles of the ‘employer’ or one of the three 
‘employees’ are assigned. The employer chooses an ‘employment contract’ with a ‘high 
wage’ or a ‘low wage’. Employees choose a ‘work’ intensity and a ‘sabotage’ level.  
The experiment was conducted in the Laboratory for Experimental Research at the University 
of Bonn and the Laboratory for Experimental Research at the University of Erfurt. All 
sessions were computerized and the software was developed by using RatImage (Abbink and 
Abdolkarim Sadrieh, 1995). Recruitment was done by ORSEE (Ben Greiner, 2004). In total, 
336 students of different disciplines were involved. Each candidate was allowed to participate 
in one session only. To resemble the fact that tournaments are often repeatedly conducted 
with the same contestants – think, for example, of ‘seller-of-the-year’ contests – and to allow 
for learning a session consisted of 30 repetitions (rounds) of the same tournament setting with   11
fixed matching and roles.
7 After each round all players observed the own payoff, the output of 
each agent and the principal’s payoff. Each session lasted for about 2 hours and participants 
earned 19.4 Euro on average. After the instructions were read to the participants they were 
randomly and anonymously matched to groups of four. Roles as principal and agents were 
also randomly allocated. Each group constitutes a statistically independent observation. We 
collected 24 observations with 96 subjects for each of the treatments Baseline and NoSabo 
and 12 observations with 48 subjects for each of the other three treatments. In the experiment 
the payoffs were given in ‘Talers’, all subjects received an endowment of 1,200 Talers and at 
the end Talers were converted into Euro by a previously known exchange rate of 200 Talers 
per 1 Euro. All subjects were paid anonymously.  
 
III.  Results 
A. Tournament Incentives 
According to our analysis in section I, effort and sabotage should increase with widening the 
prize spread. This prediction is in line with the behavior we observe. Figures 2 and 3 show 
average effort and sabotage activities depending on the prize spread and the wage sum.  
 
Figures 2 and 3 about here 
 
Table 3 summarizes the results of a regression analysis. We use random effects estimates with 
robust standard errors for groups. In models (1) individual effort is the dependent variable. In 
panel [A] the variables “∆j” are dummy variables taking the value “1” if the respective prize  
                                                 
7  One could argue that repeated tournaments are especially prone to collusion since agents might (implicitly) 
agree on exerting low effort and winning the prize in turns. In our data we do not observe indications for 
collusion. Even in the Chat treatment agents do not discuss this possibility. This might be due to the fact that in 
our setting agents do not have the possibility to exclusively communicate with each other, i.e., to exclude the 
principal from their communication (for studies on collusion in tournaments, see Harbring, 2006, and Matthias 
Sutter and Christina Strassmair, 2009).   12
spread j = 1, …, 4 is chosen by the principal and “0” otherwise. The category omitted here is 
the fixed wage with ∆0 which serves as the reference situation. We find that the coefficients of 
the dummy variables for the prize spreads are all highly significantly positive. Thus, effort is 
higher with tournament incentives than with fixed wages. For example, relative to fixed 
wages effort increases by 7.149 ceteris paribus if a tournament is implemented with the 
lowest positive prize spread ∆1. Coefficients are increasing with an increasing prize spread, 
though not significantly for all comparisons made in pairs. The coefficient for ∆1 is 
significantly smaller than that for ∆2 (Wald test, two-sided, Prob > chi
2 = 0.000) and the 
coefficient for ∆2 is significantly smaller than the one for ∆3 (Wald test, two-sided, Prob > 
chi
2 = 0.027). The difference between the coefficients for ∆3 and ∆4 is not significant (Wald 
test, two-sided, Prob > chi
2 = 0.112). The prize spread coefficients in model (2) with 
individual sabotage as a dependent variable are all highly significantly positive. The 
coefficients again tend to increase with the prize spread (∆1 vs. ∆3: Wald test, Prob > chi
2 = 
0.012 and ∆2 vs. ∆4: Wald test, Prob > chi
2 = 0.001). These results are also confirmed by the 
regressions reported in panel [B]. The coefficients for the variable “∆” indicate the changes of 
the respective dependent variable for an increase of one unit of ∆. Effort and sabotage 
significantly increase in the wage spread ∆. The increases, however, are smaller than 
predicted by the model discussed in section I. The corresponding increases for effort should 
be 0.292 per unit of ∆ and 0.083 for sabotage. As can be seen from Table 3, panel [B], the 
actual increases are 0.110 for effort and 0.041 for sabotage. We also checked whether the 
tournament incentives are different for different wage levels by introducing interaction 
variables into the regressions which interact the dummy variable “High Wage Sum” (taking 
the value 1 for cases in which the high wage level is chosen and 0 for the low wage level) and   13
the variables “∆j” and “∆”. The resulting coefficients are not significant confirming the 
theoretical prediction that tournament incentives are the same for different wage sums.
8 
OBSERVATION 1: Effort and sabotage increase with the prize spread.  
Output results from effort and sabotage and is predicted to increase with widening the prize 
spread. The average output per prize spread in each treatment is depicted in Figure 4. Model 
(3) in Table 3, panel [B] confirms that output is increasing in “∆” although the actual increase 
appears to be rather small compared to the theoretical prediction of 0.125. Models (4) explain 
the difference of marginal costs of effort and marginal costs of sabotage which should be 
equal to zero in equilibrium. All coefficients in panel [A] capturing the effects of the prize 
spreads compared to fixed wages are negative indicating that sabotage is increasing stronger 
than effort if tournament incentives are implemented (except for ∆3).  
 
Figure 4 about here 
 
B. Reciprocity 
From standard tournament theory one would expect that effort and sabotage only increase 
with the wage spread but not with the wage sum. As discussed above, we know from many 
experiments, however, that an intentionally chosen high wage can indeed induce agents to 
reciprocate with kindness. Kindness of an agent towards the principal could take two forms in 
our setting: higher effort and lower sabotage. Both would increase the principal’s payoff but 
the effects on the chances of winning the tournament are different. A decrease of sabotage  
                                                 
8  We additionally conduct non-parametric tests comparing average effort and sabotage for fixed wages vs. 
tournament incentives (i.e., contracts with positive wage spread). By applying the Wilcoxon Signed Rank-test 
for dependent pairs we can confirm the results from the regressions: effort and sabotage are higher under 
tournament incentives than under fixed wages in all treatments (except for effort in Chat). Note that some 
observations must be omitted from the analysis since one can only compare averages for different contracts in 
groups in which both types of contracts are actually chosen by the principal.   14
reduces the own chances of winning. Exerting higher effort serves the purpose of being kind 
towards the principal and at the same time increases the own chances of winning. Figure 2 
indeed shows that effort is higher for the high wage sum than for the low wage sum in all 
three treatments. The same is not true for sabotage (see Figure 3). The highly significant 
coefficients for “High Wage Sum” in Table 3 validate that effort is significantly higher for the 
high wage level than for low wages. We do not find a corresponding effect for sabotage.
9 
OBSERVATION 2: Effort increases with the wage sum, but sabotage does not. 
C. Reduction of Sabotage 
Hitherto we have not analyzed possible differences between the treatments. We do so by 
applying the Mann Whitney U-Test (see Table 4). Our results indicate that sabotage is 
reduced by framing the situation as an employment context and explicitly using the term 
‘sabotage’. The results from non-parametric tests show that sabotage is significantly lower in 
Framing than in Baseline particularly if high wages and fixed wages are selected. The dummy 
variable “Framing” is also significantly negative in models (2) in Table 3. This reduction in 
sabotage leads to an increase in output as well as to an improvement of the relation of effort 
and sabotage (see models (3) and (4) in Table 3 and also non-parametric results in Table 4). 
OBSERVATION 3: Framing the situation as an employment situation and explicitly calling 
sabotage by its name reduces destructive activities compared to a neutral framing. 
 
Table 4 about here 
 
                                                 
9  To check whether the increase in effort is indeed due to reciprocity and not a repeated game effect we ran OLS 
regressions (with robust standard errors for groups) for last-round behavior with the same variables as depicted 
by Table 3. Also in the last round effort is significantly higher for the high wage sum than for low wages, but 
sabotage does not differ. Additionally, we conducted a treatment W300 in which the wage sum was fixed to the 
low wage level of 300, i.e., the principal could only choose the prize spread, but not the wage sum. We do not 
find any significant differences in effort and sabotage levels between W300 and the low wage level in Baseline.   15
Introducing communication among the principal and the three agents has a considerable 
impact on behavior. Effort significantly increases and sabotage significantly decreases which 
ceteris paribus results in significantly higher output of roughly 17.5 (Table 3). Also the 
relation of effort and sabotage is improved significantly compared to Baseline (Models (4) in 
Table 3). The regression results are all confirmed by non-parametric testing (Table 4). 
OBSERVATION 4 :  Communication reduces sabotage and increases effort compared to a 
treatment without communication.  
The positive effect of the dummy variable “Chat” on effort and the negative effect on 
sabotage disappear in our last-round regressions which indicates that the cooperation 
enhancing effect of communication only survives as long as the interaction is repeated. 
Whether the increases in effort and the reduction in sabotage come with different contracts 
chosen by the principals is investigated in the next section. 
 
D. Contracts 
Figure 5 provides the frequencies of the different contracts chosen by the principals. The 
contract with the largest prize spread and the low wage level favored by our analysis in 
section I is clearly not the most frequent choice in any of the treatments.
10 
 
Figure 5 and Table 5 about here 
 
Non-parametric testing of the frequencies of each contract type shows that tournament 
incentive contracts are more frequently chosen than fixed wages in Baseline and Framing (see 
Table 5). In Chat the high fixed wage is more frequently selected by the principal than the 
                                                 
10  We also conducted the treatment NoSabo in which agents could only choose effort, but no sabotage. In this 
setting tournament incentive contracts are selected in about 85% of the cases and the highest prize spread with 
the low wage level is indeed the contract which is most frequently chosen by the principal. This result is in line 
with the findings from Falk et al. (2008).   16
tournament incentive contracts with the high wage sum (Wilcoxon Signed Rank-Test, 
α = 0.0995, two-tailed). The high fixed wage is even chosen in almost 50% of the cases in 
Chat (see Figure 5).  
 
Table 6 about here 
 
While in Baseline and in Framing low wages are more often selected than high wages, the 
opposite is the case in Chat (Table 5). It seems that in Baseline and Framing the choice of 
contracts is closer to the theoretical prediction than in Chat: More incentive contracts are 
selected than fixed wages and more low wages are implemented than high wages. Table 6 
shows the comparison across treatments. 
OBSERVATION 5: Communication leads participants to coordinate on high fixed wages. 
IV.  Concluding Remarks 
Organizations are well advised to take the problem of sabotage seriously. We have 
unambiguously shown that agents react to increases in tournament incentives by exerting 
more effort, but also more sabotage. Both increases, however, seem to be less steep than 
suggested by theory. Secondly, and probably undervalued by standard tournament theory, our 
study shows that agents react reciprocally to higher wages by exerting higher effort even in 
the presence of tournament incentives. However, sabotage is not reduced. Making agents 
aware that destructive activities are in fact ‘sabotage’, for example by using a language that 
leaves no doubt about the immorality of the activity, tends to mitigate the problem. This 
finding might explain why codes of corporate conducts devote a considerable part of their 
content to advising employees against ‘uncooperative’ behavior within the company. 
Interestingly, we find that introducing a communication device – or bringing the setting closer 
to reality where communication seems to be a natural option – drastically reduces the number   17
of tournament incentive contracts. Apparently, in our repeated setting, principal and agents 
are able to endogenously coordinate on high fixed wages that yield high effort and low 
sabotage in return. This agreement in fact raises efficiency, i.e., payoffs for principals and 
agents are significantly higher in Chat than in Baseline. The fact that many companies are 
reluctant to excessively use relative performance evaluation schemes, like “rank and yank” 
systems, seems to reflect our finding.  
We provide clean empirical evidence on sabotage in tournaments. Our experimental approach 
enables us directly to relate incentivized behavior with tournament theory. Of course, findings 
from the laboratory might not be transferable to organizations on a one-to-one basis. Facing 
the inherent problems of collecting reliable data on sabotage, however, makes conducting 
comprehensive studies in the laboratory appear as a valuable – not to say a mandatory – step 
towards a better understanding of behavior under relative performance evaluation schemes.   18
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Figures 
Figure 1: Sequence of the game 
 










Principal offers contract: 
(1)  wage sum W 
(2)  wage spread ∆  
Agents are informed 
about wage contract 
Agents i choose  
productive effort ei and 
sabotage activity si   22
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Tables 
 
Table 1: Design alternatives for wage contracts 
 Prize  differential 
∆j 
Low wage level W = 300  High wage level W = 600 
Fixed Wages  ∆0 = 0  100 for each agent  200 for each agent 













  ∆2 = 96  68 164  168  264 
  ∆3 = 144  52 196  152  296 




Table 2: Equilibrium predictions for each prize spread 
  Fixed Wages  Tournament Incentives 
  ∆0  ∆1  ∆2  ∆3  ∆4 
Effort 0  14  28  42  56 
Sabotage 0 4  8  12  16 
Output 0  6  12  18  24 
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Table 3: Regression results 
[A]  (1) (2) (3)  (4) 
Dependent variable:  Effort  Sabotage  Output  MC(Effort) – MC (Sabo) 
        
∆1  7.149*** 4.351***  -1.505  -0.229*** 
  (2.480) (0.680) (2.360)  (0.078) 
∆2  13.430*** 5.319***  2.802  -0.147* 
  (2.490) (0.740) (2.420)  (0.084) 
∆3  17.580*** 6.360***  4.902*  -0.132 
  (2.290) (1.130) (2.640)  (0.110) 
∆4  20.880*** 8.153***  4.721  -0.212* 
  (2.820) (1.180) (3.100)  (0.120) 
High Wage Sum  8.936***  0.519  7.887***  0.203*** 
  (1.340) (0.450) (1.300)  (0.046) 
Framing 0.222  -2.561**  5.348*  0.262** 
  (2.300) (1.110) (3.220)  (0.130) 
Chat  10.450*** -3.464*** 17.410***  0.646*** 
  (3.700) (1.300) (3.920)  (0.140) 
Round  -0.452*** -0.084** -0.285***  -0.005 
  (0.077) (0.033) (0.098)  (0.004) 
Constant  27.730*** 6.375*** 14.940***  0.153 
  (2.340) (1.050) (2.700)  (0.110) 
R
2 0.127  0.154  0.066  0.079 
Observations  3699 3699 3699  3699 
 
 
[B]  (1) (2) (3)  (4) 
Dependent variable:  Effort  Sabotage  Output  MC(Effort) – MC (Sabo) 
        
∆  0.110*** 0.041***  0.030**  -0.001 
  (0.013) (0.006) (0.015)  (0.001) 
High Wage Sum  8.805***  0.413  7.966***  0.210*** 
  (1.350) (0.440) (1.340)  (0.048) 
Framing 0.188  -2.646**  5.481*  0.270** 
  (2.370) (1.100) (3.220)  (0.13) 
Chat 9.965***  -3.811***  17.630***  0.667*** 
  (3.740) (1.330) (3.990)  (0.150) 
Round  -0.452*** -0.089*** -0.275***  -0.004 
  (0.077) (0.033) (0.096)  (0.004) 
Constant  28.720*** 7.276*** 14.130***  0.091 
  (2.200) (1.000) (2.530)  (0.100) 
R
2 0.125  0.149  0.065  0.076 
Observations  3699 3699 3699  3699 
 
Random effects estimates with robust standard errors for groups are reported. Models (1) – (3) explain individual 
effort, sabotage, and output. Model (4) explains the difference between marginal costs of effort and marginal 
costs of sabotage.  
*       weakly  significant:    0.05 < α ≤ 0.10 
*  *     significant:      0.01 < α ≤ 0.05 
* * *       highly significant:   α ≤ 0.01 
   28
Table 4: Comparisons between treatments  
 Baseline  vs.  Framing  Baseline  vs.  Chat 
Effort   34.3  <  35.0    34.3  <**  43.6 
Low Wage Level 



























            
Sabotage  9.5 >* 7.1  9.5  >*** 4.4 
Low Wage Level 



























            
Output  15.4 <* 20.8  15.4  <*** 34.7 
Low Wage Level 



























Comparisons between treatments: By using the Mann Whitney U-Test (two-tailed) we report the level of 
significance at which the null hypothesis can be rejected in favor of the alternative hypothesis that average 
values are above Baseline (<) or below Baseline (>): 
*       weakly  significant:    0.05 < α ≤ 0.10 
*  *     significant:      0.01 < α ≤ 0.05 
* * *       highly significant:   α ≤ 0.01 
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Table 5: Comparison of contract percentages within each treatment 
 Baseline  Framing  Chat 
Low Wage Level 





















No Contract  12.5  8.1  2.2 
Comparisons within a treatment: By using the Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test (two-tailed) we state the level of 
significance at which the null hypothesis can be rejected in favor of the alternative hypothesis that the frequency 
of the type of contract is above (>) or below (<) the second type of contract: 
*       weakly  significant:    0.05 < α ≤ 0.10 
*  *     significant:      0.01 < α ≤ 0.05 
* * *       highly significant:   α ≤ 0.01 
 
 
Table 6: Comparison of contract percentages between treatments 
 Baseline  vs.  Framing   Baseline  vs. Chat 
Low Wage Level   




























No Contract  12.5 >  8.1    12.5  >***  2.2 
Comparisons between treatments: By using the Mann Whitney U-Test (two-tailed) we report the level of 
significance at which the null hypothesis can be rejected in favor of the alternative hypothesis that average 
values are above Baseline (<) or below Baseline (>): 
*       weakly  significant:    0.05 < α ≤ 0.10 
*  *     significant:      0.01 < α ≤ 0.05 
* * *       highly significant:   α ≤ 0.01 
 
 